

## Packet Header Analysis on the IXP 1200 Network Processor

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## Outline

1. Network Intrusion Detection Systems
2. Network Processors
3. Packet Header Analysis on IXP 1200
4. Future Directions

## Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS)

- Per packet processing
- Signatures describe dangerous packets
- Snort ([www.snort.org](http://www.snort.org))
  - Open Source
  - Widely deployed
  - State of the art

## Snort Signatures

```
# (C) Copyright 2001,2002, Martin Roesch, Brian Caswell, et al.  
# All rights reserved.  
# Sid: icmp.rules,v 1.18 2002/08/18 20:28:43 cazz Exp S  
# ICMP RULES  
#-----  
# Description:  
# These rules are potentially bad ICMP traffic. They include most of the  
# ICMP scanning tools and other "BAD" ICMP traffic (Such as redirect host)  
#  
# Other ICMP rules are included in icmp-info.rules  
alert icmp SENET any -> SHNET any (itype:5;icode:1; )  
alert icmp SENET any -> SHNET any (itype:5;icode:0; )  
alert icmp SENET any -> SHNET any (itype: 4; icode: 0; )  
alert icmp SENET any -> SHNET any (itype: 8; icmp_id: 0; icmp_seq: 0; dsize:4; )  
alert icmp SENET any -> SHNET any (content:"|495353504e475251|"; itype:8;  
depth:32;)
```

## Signature Structure

```
alert icmp $ENET any -> $HNET any (content:"|495353504e475251|"; itype:8; depth:32;)
```

↙ alert

**ACTION:** possible values include alert, log, dynamic

↘ icmp \$ENET any -> \$HNET any

**HEADER:** defines values of protocol, source and destination IPs and ports

↙ (content:"|495353504e475251|"; itype:8; depth:32;)

**OPTIONS:** defines values of other protocol fields, including payload searches

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
## Network Processors

- Flexibility and Performance
  - Speed : Application Specific Integrated Circuit
  - Flexibility : General Purpose Host Processor
- Extra hardware units
  - Exploit packet parallelism
  - Pipelining
- Difficult to program

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## Micro Engines

- A.k.a. uEngines
- Four h/w supported threads
  - Support of references
- 2 K instruction memory
- 128 general purpose registers

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## Network Processors

- Already studied for routing like applications
  - Modularity + Performance
    - Intel ACEs
    - VERA by Princeton University
    - Netbind by Columbia University
  - Modularity supports much easier programming
  - Comes at some cost on Performance
  - NIDS need Performance

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1. Network Intrusion Detection Systems
2. Network Processors
3. **Packet Header Analysis on IXP 1200**
  1. **Work Overview**
  2. Software Architecture
  3. The S2I tool
  4. Experiments
4. Future Directions

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## Work Overview : Objective

Facilitate deployment of IXP in NIDS


- Use the IXP for Packet Header Analysis
  - Investigate and propose programming methodology
  - Common tasks should be easy to perform
    - Updates on the active signatures

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## Use case example



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## Software Architecture


- Minimal infrastructure
  - Static Section – Never changes
  - IXP 1200 specific
  - Packet distribution to workers
- Primary Concerns
  - Space: minimal overhead in instructions and registers
  - Time: maximize *headroom* of each worker


» [sbp](#)

## Basic design guidelines

- Independent packet processing
  - Minimize accesses to shared resources
  - Why ?

## IXP 1200 Top View





## Bus Architecture

- Shared, Time Division Multiplexing
- Smallest latency too high
  - 15 to 22 cycles to read minimum data
- inter uEngine communication
  - Not supported efficiently:
    - Only through shared resources

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## Design Considerations


- Memory latency
  - NIDS (would) require *multiple* accesses to memory (In contrast with routing applications)
  - Expensive inter uEngine communication

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## Software Architecture

- Isolate work of each uEngine:
  - Avoid using shared resources
  - Assign whole packet processing to a single uEngine
    - Packet per thread ?
    - Packet per uEngine ?

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## Thread Based


- All threads same code
- 4 pkts per uEngine active

+ Simple programming model

- Wasted registers (14 registers \* 4 threads = 56 registers with headers, interleaved access)

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## uEngine Based



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## Thread vs uEngine

- All threads same code
- 4 pkts per uEngine active
- + Simple programming model
- Wasted registers (14 registers \* 4 threads = 56 registers with headers) – (interleaved access)
- Thread specific jobs
- 1 pkt per uEngine active
- More complicated programming model
- + 42 additional free registers per uEngine

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## Why building S2I ?

- Large set of signatures ( around 100 )
  - Difficult to hand code
- Frequent updates/changes
  - Difficult to maintain
- S2I Tool
  - Automates the production of efficient code using standard techniques.

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## Input File

S2I Tool  
(Configuration File)

Output File  
(o)

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## S2I Features


- Parses regular signature files
  - Can use the signatures already provided
- Combines signatures in a Tree Structure
  - Efficient use of instruction memory,
  - Faster execution
- Use of literals instead of references
  - Minimizes accesses to shared resources

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## Tree Representation



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## Use of Literals

- `If (protocol == signature[i].protocol){`  
...  
}
- `If (protocol == 6 ) {`  
...  
}

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## Experiments


- Evaluate Static Section
  - Headroom
- Evaluate Dynamic Section
  - Space : How many signatures can fit
  - Time : How many signatures can be checked
- 100 Mbit/s

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## Static Section - Headroom



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## Dynamic Section - Space

Signature File	No signatures	Plain code instr.	Tree code instr.	Reduction
Icmp-info	79	>2000	479	>69%
Backdoor	44	1531	886	42%
Web-misc	18	401	277	31%
Virus	6	173	149	14%
Web.cgi	4	145	120	17%

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## Dynamic Section - Time

Scenario	Plain Code	Tree Code	Reduction
Sig0+Sig4	75	60	20%
Sig1+Sig4	74	62	16%
Sig2+Sig4	74	59	20%
Sig3+Sig4	74	61	18%
Sig4	47	29	38%
<i>Average</i>	<i>69</i>	<i>54</i>	<i>21%</i>

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## Future Directions

- Exact way of an IXP based or IXP enabled intrusion detection system
- Adopt features of newer IXP models.
  - New Software Architecture
- Enhanced code generation
  - Better context swapping control
  - Use of profiling for tree construction
- Content search support
- Gigabit links